Gödel's is a newsletter about interweaving ideas and making decisions under uncertain conditions. I discuss knowledge management, mental models, and supporting Tools for Thought.
The paradox of non-existence is one of philosophy's oldest and most perplexing puzzles. It poses intriguing questions about the nature of existence and non-existence and how we understand, perceive, and interact with both. This philosophical puzzle dates back to the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. He proposed that non-existence is impossible since any talk about non-existence implies its existence. Parmenides famously declared:
Never will this prevail, that what is not is: restrain your thought from this road of inquiry
This puzzle can be explained through a simple example: consider a unicorn. We know unicorns don't exist, yet we can describe them, draw them, and even write stories about them. So, what does it mean to discuss something that doesn't exist? Are we talking about nothing or just something that doesn't exist? This paradox, inherent in our discourse and understanding of reality, has been the subject of much philosophical debate.
Renowned philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alexius Meinong, and Bertrand Russell have deeply pondered this paradox and offered their distinct perspectives.
Starting with Wittgenstein's take on this matter he believed that language plays a pivotal role in forming our understanding of existence and non-existence. In his seminal work "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," he proposed that language structures our world, thus limiting what can be meaningfully discussed. According to him, sentences about non-existing entities are nonsensical because those entities have no logical space in the world. As per Wittgenstein's philosophy, when discussing unicorns or any other non-existent entity, we are not referring to an actual object but merely playing a language game.
Meinong had a different perspective on this issue; he argued for a theory called 'Meinong's Jungle.' According to him, even non-existing objects have some form of being because they possess properties. For example, unicorns might not exist, but they do hold properties such as having one horn or being mythical creatures. So, according to Meinong’s theory of objects (Gegenstandstheorie), non-existent objects have a certain kind of subsistence even if they don't exist in the real world.
On the other hand, Bertrand Russell strongly disagreed with Meinong. He found Meinong's approach to be paradoxical and problematic. In his theory of 'Descriptions,' he argued that sentences about non-existent entities are not actually about those entities but about the properties attributed to them. For instance, when we say "unicorns are mythical creatures," we are not referring to an actual unicorn, but to the properties we ascribe to what we consider a unicorn.
These philosophical explorations of non-existence paradox highlight how our understanding of reality is tied intricately with our language and perception. Wittgenstein sees it as a linguistic issue, Meinong views it as an ontological problem, while Russell considers it a matter of semantics.
However, none resolves the paradox; each merely offers a different lens through which to view it. Despite their efforts, the question still lingers: How can something that does not exist still manage to be discussed and understood?